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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
FINLEY BRIGGS, STRATFORD
WENDELBOE, R. G. APGOOD,
R 0 D N E Y BUTTERWORTH,
RUSSELL LARSEN, JOE OLIVER, 'VILLIAMS JAMES, AND
\ Case No.
ORSON D. SPENCER,
9898
Plaintiffs and Appellants_,

)

vs.
LINCOLN HANKS,
Defendant and Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action involving the applicability of the
Statute of Frauds to an oral agreement wherein the
promisees have fully performed their part of the bargain, and the promissor was to sell certain shares of
corporate stock to be evidenced by a letter thirteen
months after acquiring the stock, the stock in question
having a value or price in excess of fifty dollars.
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The case reached pretrial on October 18, 1962, at
which time the pretrial judge entered a Pretrial Order,
determining the pleadings setting forth the issues for
trial with noted exceptions.
Defendant at this pretrial made a motion that
plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action, which set forth an
oral agreement, be dismissed, for it was unenforceable
as a matter of law, under the State of Colorado Statute
of Frauds.
The pretrial judge denied defendant's motion.
On ~larch 19, 1963, another District Court Judge
presiding on the pretrial division, in effect reversed the
District Court Judge who denied defendant's first motion for a Summary Judgment by granting a Summary
Judgment on plaintiffs' Second Cause of Action.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiffs seek a reversal of the Summary J udgment granted on their Second Cause of Action.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
The parties will be referred to as in the court below.
There are eight plaintiffs, namely: Finley Briggs, Strat-

4
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ford W endelboe, R. G. Apgood, Rodney Butterworth,
Russell Larsen, Joseph Oliver, William James, and
Orson D. Spencer. They will be identified by their last
names when referred to individually and as plaintiffs
when referred to collectively.
Defendant, Lincoln Hanks, shall be referred to as
defendant or Hanks.

B. THE FACTS
Life Assurance Company of the West, hereafter
referred to as the "Company," is a Colorado insurance
corporation with its principal office located in Denver,
Colorado. This company obtained its operating capital
through a public offering of its stock to residents of
Colorado.
Defendant, a resident of Salt Lake City, was employed by the company as a consultant to advise, and
assist in the public sale of its stock. (R. 351, page 2,
interrogatory 6.) Hanks was a best efforts underwriter.
Defendant's duties included the preparation of sales
presentation material and manuals, preparation of
material to be used in a direct-mail advertising program, furnish the company with copies of various forms,
compile daily records and sales summaries; and hire
train and supervise a total sales force to help sell the
company stock. (R. 351, pages 2 and 3.)
Defendant had furnished similar services for other
cmnpanies offering securities to the public, and all plain-

5
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tiffs, except for W endelboe and James had been working for defendant in Las Vegas, Nevada, on a public
stock offering just prior to the company's sale of stock
in Colorado. (R. 359, Briggs; R. 211, Butterworth;
R. 86, Oliver; R. 232, Spencer; R. 281, Apgood; R.
166, Larsen.)
James was hired by Hanks through an ad in the
paper. (R. 136.)
Defendant agreed with all plaintiffs that their
compensation would be on a commission basis, namely:
(a) 10% of the cash received for subscription
contracts for company stock as subscribers
paid their subscription agreements to be
paid by the company; and
(b) 2% bonus of each plaintiff's total sales to
be paid to each plaintiff by defendant; provided, each respective plaintiff remained to
the end of the public sale of stock, until the
stock sale terminated, or the plaintiffs were
released, plus some probable stock of the
company available.
(R. 363, 406, Briggs; R. 211, 214, Butterworth;
R. 86, Oliver; R. 332, 333, Spencer; R. 87. Apgood;
R. 166, Larsen; R. 136, James; R. 253, 'Vendelboe.)
Plaintiffs were requested to sign an employment
contract with the company after their arrival in Colorado. At least one plaintiff thought that this arrangement was merely a formality and that his real employer
was Hanks. (R. 370, 382; Briggs.)

6
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In support of Briggs' testimony is Butterworth's
position where he was selling stock in Colorado on
March 3, 1961, (R. 211.) and didn't sign a contract
with the company until 1\tlarch 17, 1963. (R. 63.)
Hanks mentioned to some of the plaintiffs as early
as January and February, 1961, that he would be able
to rnake stock of the company available to them (R.
:Z11, Butterworth; R. 95 (seeR. 86.) Oliver; R. 333,
Spencer; R. 298, Apgood; R. 166, Larsen.) if they
would go to Colorado with him and sell the stock of the
company.
In fact, the plaintiffs commenced their services as
stock salesmen for the company under two employment
contracts as a result of Hanks' recruiting them to sell
the company's stock in Colorado, to wit:
(a) A contract whereby the company would pay
each plaintiff 10<fo cash of the amount received from subscription contracts solicited
by plaintiffs (See R. 63 for company contract. ) ; and
(b) A contract with Hanks, on an individual
basis, whereby he would pay each of them
2 lfo of their total sales ; provided, they remained to the end or termination of the
company's stock sale. (See R. 65 for a copy
of the Memorandum of Understanding furnished to plaintiffs by defendant and subscribed to by him.) Hanks further represented there would be stock in the company
for plaintiffs' services at some future time.
It was possible for the stock representations
by Hanks to be fulfilled when he acquired

7
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from the President of the company 10,000
shares of the company's stock for 35 cents
per share. (R. 351, page 3, interrogatory
10.) Hanks obtained the stock by representing that it was necessary to keep his men
(plaintiffs) happy. (R. 351, page 8, interrogatory 23, R. 94, 95.), and that defendant had agreed with his men that they
would receive two thirds ( 2/3) of the 10,000 shares he had acquired. (R. 351, page
8, interrogatory 23.)
Hanks related to plaintiffs at a sales meeting in
his apartment in Denver, Colorado, on April 22, 1961,
(R. 2, 256, 213, 290, 141.) That he would sell to plaintiffs 833 shares each for 35 cents per share. (R. 218,
294, 387.) Defendant further agreed to furnish a letter
or written memorandum concerning the shares ( R.
300, 212, 213.) Hanks claimed he could not deliver
plaintiffs their stock until 13 months after he received
it because of restrictions on the stock. (R. 217, 320.)
On March 6, 1962, Apgood and Briggs delivered
their respective checks for $291.55 each in full payment
of their respective shares of stock to Hanks who accepted said checks but never cashed them (R. 319,
320, 405, 406.) Apgood, Briggs, and Butterworth were
in fact owed money by defendant from the accumulating
2% bonus due them in excess of the amount they would
owe defendant in payment for their respective shares;
likewise, the other plaintiffs all had substantial amounts
due them under the 2% bonus agreement ( R. 66.) The
accumulating 2% bonus funds were earmarked to pay
for plaintiffs' shares (R. 293.)

8
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Defendant had a contract with the company dated
the 31st day of ~Iay, 1961, wherein the company conteinplated the sale of $2,225,000.00 of its stock. Defendant's compensation for his services was one per cent
(1 <t'o) on all stock subscriptions the company received
and five per cent ( 5%) on all sales made by salesmen
procured by defendant. (R. 351, page 3, see attached
contract on page 14.)
Defendant terminated his services in June, 1961,
with the company prior to the completion of its public
offering of stock. (R. 351, page 5, interrogatories 15,
16, 17 and 18.) Apgood and Briggs returned to Salt
Lake City, Utah, terminating their stock sales for the
company on June 30, 1961, (R. 315.) and continued
to work for defendant on another deal. The remaining
plaintiffs continued to sell stock for the company, continuing their sales efforts until the company completed
or terminated its sales. (R. 233.)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE PRETRIAL JUDGE ERRED IN
GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR
A SUMl\tiARY JUDGMENT AS TO PLAINTIFFS' SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION, FOR
THE ORAL AGREEMENT WAS NOT WITHIN THE STATUTE 0~-, FRAUDS OF THE
STATE OF COLORADO.

9
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Defendant cites Title 59-1-12 of the Colorado Revised Statutes, 1953, which read as follows:
"VOID AGREEMENTS.-In the following cases, every agreement shall be void, unless
such agreement, or some note of memorandum
thereof, be in writing and subscribed by the
party charged therewith:
( 1) Every agreement that by the terms is
not to be performed within one year from the
making thereof.

( 2) Every special promise to answer for
the debt, default or miscarriage of another person.
(3) Every agreement, promise or undertaking made upon consideration of marriage, except mutual promises to marry.

( 4) Every contract for the sale of any goods,
chattels or things in action, for the price of fifty
dollars or more, shall be void unless:

--

l

:1
~ J;

(a) A note or memorandum of such contract be made in writing, and be subscribed by
the parties to be charged therewith; or,
(b) Unless the buyer shall accept and receive part of such goods, or the evidence of some
of them, of such things in action; or,
(c) Unless the buyer, at the time, shall pay
some part of the purchase money."
Defendant relies on a strict rule announced in 1920
by the Supreme Court of Colorado, in Knoff v. Grace,
76 Colo. 428, 190 P. 526. This was an action by tenants
for specific performance of an oral lease for three years.

10
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Plaintiffs alleged numerous acts of part perforn1ance,
among which were that the plaintiffs had resigned positions in reliance of the oral promise, had taken possession, paid rent, and installed fixtures and other
equipment. The case does not control the oral agreement between the parties, for it involves an interest in
land. The doctrine of J(noff v. Grace arises out of the
application of Chapter 59-1-8 of the Colorado Revised
Statutes, 1953, which reads as follows:
"Every contract for the leasing for a longer
period than one year of any lands shall be void
unless in writing."
The Supreme Court of Colorado in not overruling
J(noff v. Grace broke its force in 1924 with its decision
in Moore v. Barnard_, 226 P. 134, and followed by In re
Moschetfs Estate_, 259 P. 515, in 1927.
A more recent case considered by the Colorado
Supreme Court is Rupp. v. Hill_, 367 P.2d 746, wherein
the court in considering an oral agreement between joint
owners of a ranch granted a new trial because the trial
court did not determine whether or not there had been
part performance which took the matter from without
the Statute of Frauds. The trial court was directed to
determine whether there was a parol agreement and
part performance of the parol agreement for the purpose of determining whether the facts showed partial
performance. The court further stated that the acts
relied upon should be resolved by the trier of the facts,
citing Bushner v. Bushner_, 307 P.2d 204.

11
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POINT II
WHERE ANY PROMISE OF A BILATERAL ORAL CONTRACT CAN BE FULLY
PERFORMED WITHIN ONE YEAR FRO~i
THE TIME OF THE FORMATION OF THE
C 0 NT R ACT, THE CONTRACT IS NOT
WITHIN THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS.
Whether or not a contract can or cannot be fully
performed within one year requires a literal interpreta·
tion of the facts. The fact that performance within a
year is highly improbable or not expected by the parties, does not bring a contract within the statute. See
Restatement of Contracts_, Sections 195, 198, Comment
b, Zions Service Corporation v. Danielson.. 12 Utah 2d
369, 366 p .2d 982.
Plaintiffs could and did complete the sale of the
public offering within one year. They were hired in
January, February, and March of 1961, and the company's public offering terminated about September,
1961. (R. 109.) Hanks could have delivered the stock
to plaintiffs which was in his possession but for the
pretext of security regulations preventing it. (R. 320.)
Title 59-1-8 of the Colorado Revised Statutes provides:
"Nothing in this chapter contained shall be
construed to a bridge the powers of courts of
equity to compel specific performance of agreement in cases of part performance of such agreement."

12
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The Supreme Court of Colorado has ordered spe·"
cific performance based on oral agreements when there
has been part or full performance on one side of the
contract.
In Enos v. Anderson~ 40 Colo. 395, 93 P. 475,
plaintiffs conveyed to defendant real property encumbered by a trust deed as a consideration for certain
olher property and defendant's oral promise to assume
the notes secured by the trust deed. The notes were not
due within one year. It was held that the contract was
completely executed on one side, and was therefore not
within the Statute of Frauds requiring that agreements
not to be performed within a year must be in writing.
The foregoing is indicative of the general rule as
annotated in 6 A.L.R.2d 1111.
"Complete performance by one party to an
oral contract not to be performed within one year
takes the contract out of the statute of frauds."
2 Williston on Contracts~ (Rev. Ed. 1963), Sec.
504, recites the above general rule citing Enos v. Anderson~

supra.

Dutton v. Interstate Inv. Corporation~ 119 P.2d
138, (California, 1941) is very similar to the situation
at hand, in that, plaintiff, a practical oil geologist, believed that land owned by the City of Los Angeles
contained oil-bearing sands. Plaintiff spent much time
in forming said opinion. Plaintiff went to an oil scout
whom he had known for years. Plaintiff and the oil
scout did not have the necessary assets of $100,000 to

13
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obtain a lease from the City of Los Angeles. The scout
took the proposal to obtain a lease to a third party,
and the third man entered into a "deal" whereby they
would divide any profits from the transaction equally.
The lease was made in the third party's name, and plaintiff asked the third party for a written contract on several occasions; but the third party delayed in producing
it from time to time. The third party to the transaction
acknowledged the oil scout's activities, which were primary in obtaining the lease, but refused to make any
settlement with plaintiff. The third party defended
against plaintiff's action on the basis of the Statute of
Frauds, in that, it could not be performed within a year
and must be in writing. The court held the full performance by plaintiff, removed the bar of the Statute citing:
Dougherty v. California Kettleman Oil Royalties~ Inc.~
9 Cal.2d 58, 81 69 P.2d 155; Hellings v. Wright~ 29
Cal.App. 649, 656, 156, P. 365; Restatement~ Contracts_, Sec. 198.

~:

POINT III
DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFFS HAD
AN INDEPENDENT CONTRACT RELATIYE
TO THE COMPANY'S STOCK SALE. THIS
AGREEMENT INITIALLY ORAL, WAS REDUCED TO WRITING AND SIGNED BY
DEFENDANT, BUT NOT ACCEPTED BY
PLAINTIFFS AS THEIR TOTAL AGREEMENT. THE STOCK WHICH PLAINTIFFS

14
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~1

1

~l

1\.ltE SEEKING IS PART OF THIS AGREE~IENT.

Defendant, upon hiring each plaintiff, agreed that
as part of the consideration for selling the company's
stock, he would personally pay a 2% bonus of each
plaintiff's sales; provided, each remained to the end of
the stock offering. In addition, he represented there
would be some stock of the company available to plaintiffs. The reason for defendant entering into such a
contract is obvious: He received from the company as
compensation 5% of the amount of plaintiffs' total
sales, plus an additional 1% on all stock sales.
Defendant, by acquiring stock from the President
of the company and then agreeing with plaintiffs in
April and May of 1961 to sell them a specified amount
to be delivered at a later date, was merely keeping his
promise made in January and February, 1961, in Las
Vegas, Nevada. The promise for stock is not divisible
from the agreement for the 2% bonus but is part and
parcel of what defendant agreed to pay plaintiffs for
their services. Defendant agreed to deliver a letter to
plaintiffs wherein he would grant to them the right to
purchase stock at 35 cents per share. This agreement
alone removes the oral agreement from within the
Statute of Frauds, for defendant could have delivered
the letter within one year even though the letter would
set forth that the subject stock would not be delivered
for 13 months. Defendant's Memorandum of Understanding (R. 65), which he executed, is not subject to

15
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the Parol Evidence Rule because plaintiffs, at least not
all of them, did not execute it, nor did they accept it
as their agreement. (R. 212.) Hence all the terms of
the oral agreement should be gone into by oral evidence.
Rosenfeld v. Rosenfeld~ 133 A.2d 829; Spitz v. Brickhouse~ 123 N.E.2d 117.
The most persuasive evidence sll::eporting plaintiffs'
claim to stock is the acceptance by Hanks of Apgood's
and Briggs' checks in full payment of their stock on
March 6, 1962. (R. 319, Apgood; 405, 406, Briggs.)
In summary, the full performance by plaintiffs,
the Memorandum of Understanding executed by defendant, and the acceptance by defendant of checks
in the exact amounts for the exact number of shares
which Briggs and Apgood would be entitled to purchase
under the alleged oral agreement, all support and prove
a definite oral contract which is not within the Statute
of Frauds.

POINT IV
COLORADO LAW IS NOT EXCLUSIVELY
CONTROLLING, F 0 R PLAINTIFFS ENTERED THEIR CONTRACT WITH DEFENDANT IN NEVADA AND UTAH, ALTHOUGH THEY PERFORMED THEIR
SERVICES IN COLORADO.
The place of performance for the respective parties to this action was not necessarily the same. Plain-

16
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tiffs were to perform in Colorado and did, (R. 63.)
but defendant could have performed in either Colorado
or Utah. In fact defendant did the following in Salt
Lake City, Utah:
1. Maintain an office.
2. Paid Briggs money due.
3. Accepted payment for stock from Apgood
and Briggs.
4. Hired Briggs, Larsen, Apgood, Wendelboe, and James.
The following Utah cases on the application of the
Statute of Frauds should be considered:

Utah Mercur Gold Mining Co. v. Herschel Gold
Mining Co.~ 134 P.2d 1094.
Dean v.

Davis~

Kinser v.

166 P.2d 15

Bennett~

186 P.2d 281

Dutton v. Interstate Investment
P.2d 138

Corporation~

119

POINTV
PLAINTIFFS ARE TI-IIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARIES TO THE CONTRACT BETWEEN
DEFENDANT AND QUENTIN A. STEWART,
PRESIDENT OF LIFE OF THE WEST, AND
ARE ENTITLED TO E N F 0 R C E SAID
AGREEMENT FOR THEIR BENEFIT.

17
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Plaintiffs plead in the fourth paragraph of their
Second Cause of Action that they were third-party
beneficiaries to the contract between Hanks and Stewart and that said contract between the aforesaid persons was for their benefit.
The record is uncontradicted in this matter, that
Hanks obtained from Stewart stock upon the representations that it was necessary for Hanks to acquire
said stock to deliver to his salesmen; otherwise, they
would quit; for they were not able to make a living
selling Life of the West stock. (R. 351, page 3, 4, Interroagtories 10-15.)
The law is well settled that third persons may enforce a promise made for their benefit. In the instant
case there is supporting consideration in that Hanks
received an override commission predicated on all sales
of plaintiffs. 12 Am. Jur., Sec. 277, P. 825.

POINT VI
DEFENDANT IS NOT ENTITLED TO A
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WHERE GENUINE
ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACTS EXIST.
In the case at hand, plaintiffs claim defendant
promised to give them a letter whereby each plaintiff
would be entitled to receive 833 shares of stock as above
set forth. Said letter would be in the nature of an option
agreement inuring to the benefit of each plaintiff. In
fact, the record as it now stands, is uncontradicted on

18
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this point, and it is difficult to understand how defendant could be entitled to a Summary Judgment.
In the matter of the estates of William Robert
Williams~ et at 348 P.2d 683, it is stated:
"A summary judgment is proper only if the
pleading, depositions, affidavits, and admissions
show that there is no genuine issue of rna terial
fact and that the moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law."
See also Disabled American Veterans~ Utah State
Department of Roy H. H endrixon~ et al~ 9 Utah 2d
152, where it was enunciated:
"On a motion for summary judgment against
a defendant, where some of the facts are in dispute, a judgment can properly be rendered
against a defendant only if, on the undisputed
facts, the defendant has np valid defense; if then
any material fact asserted by the plaintiff is
contradicted by the defendant, the facts as stated
by the defendant must, on such motion, be taken
as true."
CONCLUSION
The plaintiffs have fully performed a service of
great value and should be entitled to receive the fruits
of their labor. Defendant's acts were unconscionable:
He first represented that he would in some manner
make stock available to plaintiffs when he procured
their services ; then during the course of the stock sale
importuned the President of the Company for stock
under the guise that it was for plaintiffs to keep them
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at their tasks; then he related his success to plaintiffs
that he had acquired and would make it available to
them for the price of 35 cents per share (the value of
this offer represented a $4,000 profit to each plaintiff;
the same price he paid for it; while with guile put off
the delivery of the stock under a legal pretext; all the
time benefiting from plaintiffs' labors and obviously
never intending to sell the stock to plaintiffs. Hanks is
like the fox in Aesop's Fable who caught a bone in
his throat and when the pain and anguish became unbearable, offered a reward to anyone who could remove
it. Finally a crane appeared who had a long slender
neck and bill and stuck his head down the fox's throat
and removed the bone. Upon demanding his reward,
the crane was advised that he was fortunate to have his
life for the fox could have bitten off his head when it
was in his mouth.
Plaintiffs should not be left with only the cmnmission the company has paid and the 2% bonus promised
by defendant. The conduct and representations of
Hanks cannot go unheeded, and the Statute of Frauds
should not be the means to perpetrate such a gross fraud
as its application would do in this case.
Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT W. HUGHES
Attorney for Appellants
530 Judge Building

Salt Lake City, Utah
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